Everybody has a worst nightmare.
Soon we'll all be able to share one more: a passenger jet being blown out of the sky while a terrorist sips his latte in the airport lounge, having just used his cell phone to trigger the onboard bomb.
Is there a case to allow use of mobile phones on aircraft? Well, yes. But, in addition to technical problems and the prospect of 'phone rage', there is the overarching fact that the mobile is the most dangerously effective go-to plug-in for terrorists when they want to detonate bombs - and soon with the potential of remote detonation on aircraft.
Nobody, except the terrorist, wants to see that happen.
How did we get to this looming problem?
In early 2004, business groups in USA, lead by the major airlines, submitted a proposal to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to introduce in-flight use of mobile phones on all passenger aircraft. But, together with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FAA delayed a go-ahead because "the technology could interfere with avionics and onboard electronic gear" thus potentially affecting the safety of the aircraft and passengers. Moreover, it was suggested that existing ground-based cell phone systems also could be adversely affected by transmissions from aircraft.
The debate about interference to aircraft avionics persists. In 2005, a paper from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) - appropriately entitled Unsafe at Any Airspeed? and prepared by four academics - acknowledged that "there is no definitive instance of an air accident known to have been caused by a passenger's use of an electronic device" but strongly advocated curbing the use of cell phones on aircraft in view of the proven record of interference with aircraft avionics, and concluded: "Our data and the NASA studies suggest to us that there is a clear and present danger: cell phones can render GPS instrument useless for landings."
By late 2006 things had changed, technically: new technology that addresses the issue of interference to avionics, and which is supplied by two communications companies, OnAir and GSM World, has been introduced and is now undergoing in-flight tests in Europe on selected carriers, and in Australia on QANTAS. Other airlines either showing interest or actually testing the new equipment - called the picocell - include AirBus, Air France, British Midland Airways (BMI), TAP Air Portugal, Ryan Air, and Cathay Pacific. The unknown, at this point, is the effectiveness of the picocell in nullifying the danger to GPS instruments.
A bone of contention with many travellers is the potential problem of onboard 'phone rage': the risk of paying customers getting into disputes with others who tend to talk too loud, too long or both. To some extent, the picocell will handle this problem, but only in an indirect manner: the aircrew can switch off that unit at anytime of their choosing. In the context of a cell phone bomb trigger, however, 'phone rage' is a non-issue.
Hence, while electronic interference is still a safety issue with the FCC and FAA, the all-important question remains: how to prevent any use of a mobile phone to detonate a bomb. On a train or bus, it's bad enough that some die; on a plane at 10,000 metres, everybody dies. The FAA, however, already knew in 2003 that cell phones and bombs don't go together: in its corporate Employee Response to Emergencies booklet, there is a specific reference to that effect but there is no public information about the risk of cell phones as bomb triggers.
That risk is well known. As early as 2001, a would-be terrorist attempted to blow up the Vietnamese embassy in Bangkok using a mobile phone as "a remote detonation device", according to an FBI report. It's also well known that such triggers were used in the Madrid terrorist attack, in London, in Iraq and other places around the world. In 2005, the Department of Justice (DOJ) in USA warned, "that terrorists could use cell phones as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices in the air". So everybody who wants to know, knows - especially terrorists, worldwide.
So, what more can be done to reduce the threat from cell phones as bomb triggers?
Who better to ask than the relevant players? Those most involved are: the mobile phone companies, the telecommunication suppliers, the airlines and pertinent regulatory bodies.
From online website data, it appears that four majors of the cell phone industry are: Sony-Ericsson, Motorola, Vodaphone, and Nokia as the largest. However, the only publicly available data on security and safety information is in relation to normal phone use; that is, the effects of radio-frequency (RF) waves on the brain and the continued efforts to explore other health hazards. There is nothing about the misuse of mobile phones as bomb triggers.
On the website for AirBus - in joint venture with OnAir - there's not a shred of information about any technology solution designed to prevent a terrorist using an onboard mobile phone as a remote bomb trigger. On the GSM World website - the other supplier of similar technology - it's much the same: there is everything but information pertinent to this issue.
In addition to the FCC and the FAA, regulatory agency websites in Australia were searched: Civil Aviation Safety Administration (CASA), Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) and Australian Communications and Media Authority. The result: absolutely no public information on the topic of mobile phones as bomb triggers.
Email enquiries to all remained largely unanswered, with only three of the phone companies responding and with only one of those claiming that the issue has "nothing to do with cell phones as such." So, is it likely that most of these people and organizations are unaware of the risk?
Perish the thought. What's more likely, instead, is that the threat is recognized; the risk is assessed as being low; safety and security procedures are viewed as more robust since 9/11; and crucially, though extremists keep trying to blow up aircraft, nobody has succeeded yet in actualizing our collective nightmare with a cell phone - in colloquial terms, it ain't happened yet on a plane, pilgrim.
That sort of cost-benefit analysis is familiar: in brutal terms, means it's okay for some to die so that the rest of us can get on with business. In some areas, they call it 'collateral damage'; but nobody ever wants to be part of that damage. However, that is a viable frame of reference needed to maintain modern society and business growth: mining deaths are often horrendously high, but the diggers keeps digging; thousands die on the roads, but few will give up their car, and so on. Valid arguments, up to a point, but which break down when we recall that very few want to be miners, and, unless you're drunk, you have control of your car.
But, we're all travellers, of one sort or another, and often at the mercy of providers of all persuasions.
From that perspective and for some time now, it is patently obvious we have all been at greater risk of dying when commuting on buses and trains. Significantly, however, when in-flight mobile phone use is scheduled to fly, the actual risk of attack may not be too different to that for a bus or train, but survivability of any passenger is so unlikely as to be non-existent; which means, in effect, the risk of dying on a plane will soon be greater.
Management of any business includes the eternal need for risk assessment, so what else can be done to reduce that risk?
Well, consider this: some forty years ago, a then little-known consumer activist, Ralph Nader, published Unsafe at Any Speed, the book that tore the hood off automobile safety in America. In perhaps the first concerted attack on The Big Three automakers - GM, Ford and Chrysler - Mr Nader showed how well established design faults were a cause for concern and of passenger death. His book made a big impact: ultimately, the Big Three were obliged to make production changes to improve automobile safety.
There's no time, however, to wait for another book because terrorists have exploited the well established design flaw/weakness/oversight - take your pick - of cell phones for years.
And that's why the phone makers must act: first, because of the increased risk of death to all travellers and, second, corporate management knows about the problem and published history. It's probably too late to do anything about the millions of existing phones - which, over time, will be replaced anyway - but all new phones should have embedded software - a simple electronic switch - that automatically prevents tampering with its circuitry or operation, preferably to the point of rendering the unit useless and beyond repair. Considering the growth in air traffic, the market size for cell phones and the enormous profits enjoyed by manufacturers - with uninformed consumers in the middle - the financial risk for airlines, communications providers and the phone companies must be in peril as soon as one passenger aircraft is blown to bits. Quite frankly, in these days of uncertainty it's no longer an option, nor very smart, for management to sit on its hands, waiting for proof that cell phones are unsafe at any speed.
Moreover, the clock is ticking and, like I said, only a terrorist wants to see passengers wake up to live out - and die in - their worst nightmare.
Copyright Roger Burke, 2007. All rights reserved.
Roger Burke is a writer living in Queensland, Australia, and has published numerous articles and ebooks on the web. In no particular order, Roger has been a salesman, a patrol officer in New Guinea, an IT professional for thirty years, a self-defence instructor for twenty years, a web developer and a familly man with seven kids. He has a BA from Griffith University, Brisbane, and is now completing an MA (Creative Writing) with Swinburne University in Melbourne. He can be reached at mayapan1942-@-yahoo.com
